pieeprom-2025-05-08: 2711: Promote to the default release

Fixup the previous commit to include the 2711 firmware signed
with the secure-boot key.

.github/workflows/test.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+name: Test EEPROM Config
+
+on:
+  pull_request:
+    branches: [ 'master' ]
+
+jobs:
+  test:
+    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
+    steps:
+      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
+      
+      - name: Set up Python
+        uses: actions/setup-python@v4
+        with:
+          python-version: '3.x'
+          
+      - name: Create and activate virtual environment
+        run: |
+          python -m venv venv
+          source venv/bin/activate
+          
+      - name: Install dependencies
+        run: |
+          pip install pycryptodomex
+      
+      - name: Run EEPROM Config Tests
+        run: |
+          cd test
+          chmod +x test-rpi-eeprom-config
+          ./test-rpi-eeprom-config 

firmware-2711/release-notes.md

@@ -1,5 +1,24 @@
 # Raspberry Pi4 bootloader EEPROM release notes
 
+## 2025-05-13: Promote 2025-05-08 to the default release (default)
+
+## 2025-05-08: Implement TCP window for net boot (latest)
+* Signed boot and HTTP boot mode
+  HTTP boot mode is supposed to be disabled if signed boot is enabled and
+  a host is not specified. The code is checking the http_secure flag to
+  enforce this. But this is valid now we support custom CA certs.
+  Only disable HTTP mode if we're using the default HOST.
+* Implement TCP window for net boot
+  The minimal IP stack used for https booting lacks the ability to cache
+  packets received out of order, which can lead to severe slowdown when
+  it happens. The problem seems to affect some ISPs more than others.
+  The receive window implemented here copes with packet losses of 10%.
+* netboot: Correct the TCP MSS
+* Correct msecs in debug timestamps
+  The fractional part of timestamps in UART debug output was showing the
+  100ths and 1000ths of a second, rather than 10ths and 100ths, causing
+  strange sequences that appear to jump backwards.
+
 ## 2025-02-17: Promote 2025-02-11 to default release (default)
 
 ## 2025-02-11: recovery: Walk partitions to delete recovery.bin (latest)

firmware-2712/release-notes.md

@@ -1,5 +1,67 @@
 # Raspberry Pi5 bootloader EEPROM release notes
 
+## 2025-05-13: Promote 2025-05-08 to the default release (default)
+
+## 2025-05-08: Implement TCP window for net boot (latest)
+
+* arm_loader: Correct some mailbox response lengths
+  The GET_GENCMD_RESULT mailbox handler was setting the wrong response
+  length, and GET_FIRMWARE_COMMIT_HASH and GET_FIRMWARE_VARIANT were not
+  setting any length.
+  See: https://github.com/raspberrypi/firmware/issues/1968
+* Signed boot and HTTP boot mode
+  HTTP boot mode is supposed to be disabled if signed boot is enabled and
+  a host is not specified. The code is checking the http_secure flag to
+  enforce this. But this is valid now we support custom CA certs.
+  Only disable HTTP mode if we're using the default HOST.
+* Implement TCP window for net boot
+  The minimal IP stack used for https booting lacks the ability to cache
+  packets received out of order, which can lead to severe slowdown when
+  it happens. The problem seems to affect some ISPs more than others.
+  The receive window implemented here copes with packet losses of 10%.
+* netboot: Correct the TCP MSS
+* rp1_net: Overwrite the length field
+  Although concise, ORing in the packet length runs the risk of leaving
+  some unwanted bits set. Ensure the length field is cleared before
+  ORing in the required value.
+* Correct msecs in debug timestamps
+  The fractional part of timestamps in UART debug output was showing the
+  100ths and 1000ths of a second, rather than 10ths and 100ths, causing
+  strange sequences that appear to jump backwards.
+* Implement GET_BOARD_MAC_ADDRESS on Pi5
+  The Pi 5 EEPROM implements a subset of the original mailbox properties.
+  Add GET_BOARD_MAC_ADDRESS to the subset.
+  See: https://github.com/raspberrypi/rpi-eeprom/issues/698
+* Ensure the initramfs matches the kernel
+  As far as is possible, both the kernel and initramfs are matched to the
+  device. However, where multiple kernel variants can run on a device, the
+  initramfs must be matched to the chosen kernel. Make that the sole rule
+  for initramfs selection, rather than duplicating the device matching
+  logic.
+  See: https://github.com/raspberrypi/firmware/issues/1965
+* Enable logging messages from OS loader
+  Pi 5 EEPROM builds were missing the output from the main OS loading
+  function, including some important diagnostics. Enabling the logging
+  output from this loader code results in some near-duplicates, but is
+  more user friendly and is available via "sudo vclog -m".
+
+## 2025-04-07: arm_dt: Revert to using the max fan speed (latest)
+
+* arm_dt: Revert to using the max fan speed
+  It has been reported that the presence of a cooling fan at boot time
+  can lead to a maximum observed fan speed of ~300 but a current speed
+  of 0. The absence of a fan results in 0s for both metrics.
+  See: https://github.com/raspberrypi/rpi-eeprom/issues/690
+
+## 2025-03-27: os_check: cm5: Check for CM5 specific dtbs (latest)
+
+* os_check: cm5: Check for CM5 specific dtbs
+  Check for BCM2712 support in bcm2712-rpi-cm5-cm5io.dtb
+  or bcm2712-rpi-cm5l-cm5io.dtb on CM5 instead of bcm2712-rpi-5-b.dtb.
+  This avoids needing to put os_check=1 or specifying device_tree
+  in config.txt in minimal images for CM5.
+  See: https://github.com/raspberrypi/rpi-eeprom/issues/682
+
 ## 2025-03-19: Log the fan speed at boot (latest)
 
 * Log the fan speed at boot

rpi-eeprom-digest

@@ -6,8 +6,12 @@
 # a hard dependency on OpenSSL.
 
 set -e
+set -u
 
 OPENSSL=${OPENSSL:-openssl}
+KEY=""
+SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH=${SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH:-""}
+HSM_WRAPPER=""
 
 die() {
    echo "$@" >&2
@@ -46,29 +50,30 @@ RSA signature. Typically this tool is used by rpi-eeprom-update to
 generate a hash to guard against file-system corruption for EEPROM updates
 OR for signing OS images (boot.img) for secure-boot.
 
-This tool CANNOT be used directly to sign an bootloader EEPROM image
-for secure-boot because the signed data is bootloader configuration file
+This tool CANNOT be used directly to sign a bootloader EEPROM image
+for secure-boot because the signed data is the bootloader configuration file
 rather than the entire flash image.
-To create signed bootloader images please see
+To create signed bootloader images, please see
 https://github.com/raspberrypi/usbboot/tree/master/secure-boot-recovery/README.md
 
 
 Options:
-   -i The source image e.g. boot.img
-   -o The name of the digest/signature file.
-   -k Optional RSA private key.
+   -i The source image, e.g., boot.img
+   -o The name of the digest/signature file
+   -k Optional RSA private key
+   -H The name of the HSM wrapper script to invoke - default ""
 
-RSA signing
-If a private key in PEM format or a pkcs#11 URI is supplied then the
-RSA signature of the sha256 digest is included in the .sig
-file. Currently, the bootloader only supports sha256 digests signed
-with a 2048bit RSA key.  The bootloader only verifies RSA signatures
+RSA signing:
+If a private key in PEM format or a PKCS#11 URI is supplied, then the
+RSA signature of the SHA256 digest is included in the .sig
+file. Currently, the bootloader only supports SHA256 digests signed
+with a 2048-bit RSA key. The bootloader only verifies RSA signatures
 in signed boot mode and only for the EEPROM config file and the signed
 image.
 
 Examples:
 
-# Generate the normal sha256 hash to guard against file-system corruption
+# Generate the normal SHA256 hash to guard against file-system corruption
 rpi-eeprom-digest -i pieeprom.bin -o pieeprom.sig
 rpi-eeprom-digest -i vl805.bin -o vl805.sig
 
@@ -77,9 +82,14 @@ rpi-eeprom-digest -k private.pem -i boot.img -o boot.sig
 
 # Generate RSA signature for the EEPROM config file
 # As used by update-pieeprom.sh in usbboot/secure-boot-recovery
-rpi-eeprom-digest -k private.pem -i bootconf.txt  -o bootconf.sig
+rpi-eeprom-digest -k private.pem -i bootconf.txt -o bootconf.sig
+
+# Generate RSA signature for the EEPROM config file and delegate 
+# the signing process to a HSM wrapper script instead of using the private key directly.
+rpi-eeprom-digest -H hsm-wrapper -i bootconf.txt -o bootconf.sig
 
 # Similarly, but specifying the key with a PKCS#11 URI
+# (Deprecated - use HSM wrapper instead)
 rpi-eeprom-digest -k pkcs11:token=deadbeef;object=bl-key;type=private;pin-value=1234 -i bootconf.txt  -o bootconf.sig
 
 # To verify the signature of an existing .sig file using the public key.
@@ -102,7 +112,9 @@ writeSig() {
        echo "ts: $(date -u +%s)" >> "${OUTPUT}"
    fi
 
-   if [ -n "${KEY}" ]; then
+   if [ -n "${HSM_WRAPPER}" ]; then
+      echo "rsa2048: $("${HSM_WRAPPER}" -a rsa2048-sha256 "${IMAGE}")" >> "${OUTPUT}"
+   elif [ -n "${KEY}" ]; then
       "${OPENSSL}" dgst ${ENGINE_OPTS} -sign "${KEY}" -sha256 -out "${SIG_TMP}" "${IMAGE}"
       echo "rsa2048: $(xxd -c 4096 -p < "${SIG_TMP}")" >> "${OUTPUT}"
    fi
@@ -115,18 +127,20 @@ verifySig() {
    sig_hex="$(grep rsa2048 "${sig_file}" | cut -f 2 -d ' ')"
    [ -n "${sig_hex}" ] || die "No RSA signature in ${sig_file}"
 
-   echo ${sig_hex} | xxd -c 4096 -p -r > "${TMP_DIR}/sig.bin"
+   echo "${sig_hex}" | xxd -c 4096 -p -r > "${TMP_DIR}/sig.bin"
    "${OPENSSL}" dgst ${ENGINE_OPTS} -verify "${KEY}" -signature "${TMP_DIR}/sig.bin" "${IMAGE}" || die "${IMAGE} not verified"
 }
 
 OUTPUT=""
 VERIFY=0
-while getopts i:k:ho:v: option; do
+while getopts i:H:k:ho:v: option; do
    case "${option}" in
    i) IMAGE="${OPTARG}"
       ;;
    k) KEY="${OPTARG}"
       ;;
+   H) HSM_WRAPPER="${OPTARG}"
+      ;;
    o) OUTPUT="${OPTARG}"
       ;;
    v) SIGNATURE="${OPTARG}"

test/README.md

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# rpi-eeprom - unit tests
+
+## test-rpi-eeprom-config
+Unit test for rpi-eeprom-config which verifies:
+
+* rpi-eeprom-config is compatible with all EEPROM binaries
+* unit tests for modifying the boot.conf file
+* simple code signing test
+
+To run on Linux:
+```
+cd test
+./test-rpi-eeprom-config
+```

tools/rpi-sign-bootcode

@@ -2,8 +2,11 @@
 
 import argparse
 import base64
+import os
 import struct
+import subprocess
 import sys
+import tempfile
 
 # python3 -m pip install pycryptodomex
 from Cryptodome.Hash import HMAC, SHA1, SHA256
@@ -105,6 +108,30 @@ class ImageFile:
         debug("%08x %20s: [%6d] %s" % (self.pos(), 'RSA', len(arr), pem_file))
         self.append(arr)
 
+        h = SHA256.new()
+        h.update(key.n.to_bytes(256, byteorder='little'))
+        h.update(key.e.to_bytes(8, byteorder='little'))
+        d = h.hexdigest()
+        pub_str = ""
+        for i in range(int(len(d)/8)):
+           pub_str += "0x%s%s%s%s, " % (d[i*8+6:i*8+8], d[i*8+4:i*8+6], d[i*8+2:i*8+4], d[i*8+0:i*8+2])
+        debug("Public key SHA256(N,e) = %s" % pub_str)
+
+    def append_rsa_signature_pkcs11(self, hsm_wrapper):
+        temp = tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(delete=False)
+        temp.write(self._bytes)
+        temp.close() # close and flush before spawning PKCS#11 wrapper
+
+        res = subprocess.run([hsm_wrapper, "-a", "rsa2048-sha256", temp.name], capture_output=True)
+        debug(res.stderr)
+        if res.returncode != 0:
+            os.unlink(temp.name)
+            raise Exception(f"HSM wrapper failed with exit code {res.returncode}: {res.stderr.decode()}")
+        signature = res.stdout.decode()
+        os.unlink(temp.name)
+        self.append(bytearray.fromhex(signature))
+        debug("PKCS11 %08x %20s: [%6d] signature %s" % (self.pos(), 'RSA2048 - SHA256', len(signature), signature))
+
     def append_rsa_signature(self, digest_alg, private_pem):
         """
         Append a RSA 2048 signature of the SHA256 of the data so far
@@ -132,19 +159,13 @@ class ImageFile:
             if len(hmac_key) != expected_keylen:
                 raise Exception("Bad key length %d expected %d" % (len(hmac_key), expected_keylen))
 
-        if digest_alg == 'hmac-sha256':
-            digest = HMAC.new(base64.b16decode(hmac_key, True), self._bytes, digestmod=SHA256)
-        elif digest_alg == 'hmac-sha1':
-            digest = HMAC.new(base64.b16decode(hmac_key, True), self._bytes, digestmod=SHA1)
-        elif digest_alg == 'sha256':
-            digest = SHA256.new(self._bytes)
-        elif digest_alg == 'sha1':
-            digest = SHA1.new(self._bytes)
+        if digest_alg == 'hmac-sha1':
+            h = HMAC.new(base64.b16decode(hmac_key, True), self._bytes, digestmod=SHA1)
         else:
             raise Exception("Digest not supported %s" % (digest_alg))
 
-        debug("%08x %20s: [%6d] %s" % (self.pos(), digest_alg, len(digest.digest()), digest.hexdigest()))
-        self.append(digest.digest())
+        debug("%08x %20s: [%6d] %s" % (self.pos(), digest_alg, len(h.digest()), h.hexdigest()))
+        self.append(h.digest())
 
     def pos(self):
         return len(self._bytes)
@@ -161,7 +182,7 @@ class ImageFile:
     def close(self):
         self._of.close()
 
-def create_2711_image(output, bootcode, private_key, private_keynum, hmac):
+def create_2711_image(output, bootcode, private_key=None, private_keynum=0, hmac=None, hsm_wrapper=None):
     """
     Create a 2711 C0 secure-boot compatible seconds stage signed binary.
     """
@@ -169,22 +190,31 @@ def create_2711_image(output, bootcode, private_key, private_keynum, hmac):
     image.append_file(bootcode)
     image.append_length()
     image.append_keynum(private_keynum)
-    image.append_rsa_signature('sha1', private_key)
+    if hsm_wrapper:
+        image.append_rsa_signature_pkcs11(hsm_wrapper)
+    else:
+        image.append_rsa_signature('sha1', private_key)
     image.append_digest('hmac-sha1', hmac)
     image.write()
     image.close()
 
-def create_2712_image(output, bootcode, private_key, private_keynum, private_version):
+def create_2712_image(output, bootcode, private_version=0, public_key=None, private_key=None, private_keynum=0, hsm_wrapper=None):
     """
-    Create 2712 signed bootloader. The HMAC is removed and the full public key is appended.
+    Create a prototype 2712 signed bootloader. The HMAC is removed and the
+    full public key is appended.
     """
     image = ImageFile(output, MAX_BIN_SIZE)
     image.append_file(bootcode)
     image.append_length()
     image.append_keynum(private_keynum)
     image.append_version(private_version)
-    image.append_rsa_signature('sha256', private_key)
-    image.append_public_key(private_key)
+    if hsm_wrapper is not None:
+        debug(f"Call HSM wrapper {hsm_wrapper}")
+        image.append_rsa_signature_pkcs11(hsm_wrapper)
+        image.append_public_key(public_key)
+    else:
+        image.append_rsa_signature('sha256', private_key)
+        image.append_public_key(private_key)
     image.write()
     image.close()
 
@@ -193,37 +223,43 @@ def main():
     Signs a second stage bootloader image.
 
     Examples:
-        2711 mode:
-        rpi-sign-bootcode --debug -c 2711 -i bootcode.bin.clr -o bootcode.bin -k 2711_rsa_priv_0.pem -n 0 -m bootcode-production.key
-
-        2712 C1 and D0 mode:
-          * HMAC not included on 2712
-          * RSA public key included - ROM just contains the hashes of the RPi public keys.
-
-        Customer counter-signed signed:
+    
+        Customer counter-signed:
           * Exactly the same as Raspberry Pi signing but the input is the Raspberry Pi signed bootcode.bin
           * The key number will probably always be 16 to indicate a customer signing
 
         rpi-sign-bootcode --debug -c 2712 -i bootcode.bin.sign2 -o bootcode.bin -k customer.pem
+
+        PKCS#1 v1.5 - HSM wrapper:
+          * hsm-wrapper takes a single argument which is a temporary filename containing the data to sign
+          * hsm-wrapper outputs the PKCS#1 v1.5 signature in hex format
+          * hsm-wrapper must return a non-zero exit code if signing fails
+          * hsm-wrapper requires the -a rsa2048-sha256 parameter to specify the algorithm
+          * There is no facility to pass the private key or custom HSM arguments - the caller should generate a dedicated wrapper script
+          * The public key in PEM format MUST be specified with the -p option
+
+        rpi-sign-bootcode --debug -c 2712 -i bootcode.bin.sign2 -o bootcode.bin -p public.pem -H hsm-wrapper
     """
     parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(help_text)
-    parser.add_argument('-o', '--output', required=False, help='Output filename . If not specified the signed images is written to stdout in base64 format')
+    parser.add_argument('-o', '--output', required=False, help='Output filename. If not specified, the signed image is written to stdout in base64 format')
     parser.add_argument('-c', '--chip', required=True, type=int, help='Chip number')
-    parser.add_argument('-i', '--input', required=False, help='Path of the unsigned bootcode.bin file OR RPi signed bootcode file sign with the customer key. If NULLL the binary is read from stdin in base64 format')
+    parser.add_argument('-i', '--input', required=False, help='Path of the unsigned bootcode.bin file OR RPi signed bootcode file to be signed with the customer key. If NULL, the binary is read from stdin in base64 format')
     parser.add_argument('-m', '--hmac', required=False, help='Path of the HMAC key file')
-    parser.add_argument('-k', '--private-key', dest='private_key', required=True, help='Path of RSA private key (PEM format)')
+    parser.add_argument('-k', '--private-key', dest='private_key', required=False, default=None, help='Path of RSA private key (PEM format)')
+    parser.add_argument('-p', '--public-key', dest='public_key', required=False, default=None, help='Path of RSA public key (PEM format)')
     parser.add_argument('-n', '--private-keynum', dest='private_keynum', required=False, default=0, type=int, help='ROM key index for RPi signing stage')
+    parser.add_argument('-H', '--hsm-wrapper', default=None, required=False, help='Filename of HSM wrapper script which generates a PKCSv1.1 signature as hex')
     parser.add_argument('-d', '--debug', action='store_true')
-    parser.add_argument('-v', '--private-version', dest='private_version', required=True, type=int, help='Version of firmware, stops firmware rollback, only valid 0-31')
+    parser.add_argument('-v', '--private-version', dest='private_version', required=False, default=0, type=int, help='Version of firmware, stops firmware rollback, only valid 0-31')
 
     args = parser.parse_args()
     _CONFIG['DEBUG'] = args.debug
     if args.chip == 2711:
         if args.hmac is None:
             raise Exception("HMAC key requried for 2711")
-        create_2711_image(args.output, args.input, args.private_key, args.private_keynum, args.hmac)
+        create_2711_image(args.output, args.input, private_key=args.private_key, private_keynum=args.private_keynum, hmac=args.hmac, hsm_wrapper=args.hsm_wrapper)
     elif args.chip == 2712:
-        create_2712_image(args.output, args.input, args.private_key, args.private_keynum, args.private_version)
+        create_2712_image(args.output, args.input, private_version=args.private_version, public_key=args.public_key, private_key=args.private_key, private_keynum=args.private_keynum, hsm_wrapper=args.hsm_wrapper)
 
 if __name__ == '__main__':
     main()