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Author SHA1 Message Date
Phil Elwell
07fe5c48b7 bug_report template: Be more precise about the UART pins 2024-12-10 14:34:38 +00:00
52 changed files with 64 additions and 533 deletions

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@@ -40,11 +40,8 @@ body:
multiple: true
options:
- Raspberry Pi 5
- Raspberry Pi 500
- Raspberry Pi 4 Mod. B
- Raspberry Pi 400
- Raspberry Pi CM5
- Raspberry Pi CM5 Lite
- Raspberry Pi CM4
- Raspberry Pi CM4 Lite
- Raspberry Pi CM4-S

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@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
name: Test EEPROM Config
on:
pull_request:
branches: [ 'master' ]
jobs:
test:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Set up Python
uses: actions/setup-python@v4
with:
python-version: '3.x'
- name: Create and activate virtual environment
run: |
python -m venv venv
source venv/bin/activate
- name: Install dependencies
run: |
pip install pycryptodomex
- name: Run EEPROM Config Tests
run: |
cd test
chmod +x test-rpi-eeprom-config
./test-rpi-eeprom-config

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@@ -6,14 +6,10 @@ Files: *
Copyright: 2019, Raspberry Pi (Trading) Ltd.
License: BSD-3
Files: firmware-2711/*
Files: firmware/*
Copyright: 2019, Raspberry Pi (Trading) Ltd.
License: custom
Files: firmware-2712/*
Copyright: 2024, Raspberry Pi (Trading) Ltd.
License: custom
License: BSD-3
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions

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@@ -1,61 +1,5 @@
# Raspberry Pi4 bootloader EEPROM release notes
## 2025-05-13: Promote 2025-05-08 to the default release (default)
## 2025-05-08: Implement TCP window for net boot (latest)
* Signed boot and HTTP boot mode
HTTP boot mode is supposed to be disabled if signed boot is enabled and
a host is not specified. The code is checking the http_secure flag to
enforce this. But this is valid now we support custom CA certs.
Only disable HTTP mode if we're using the default HOST.
* Implement TCP window for net boot
The minimal IP stack used for https booting lacks the ability to cache
packets received out of order, which can lead to severe slowdown when
it happens. The problem seems to affect some ISPs more than others.
The receive window implemented here copes with packet losses of 10%.
* netboot: Correct the TCP MSS
* Correct msecs in debug timestamps
The fractional part of timestamps in UART debug output was showing the
100ths and 1000ths of a second, rather than 10ths and 100ths, causing
strange sequences that appear to jump backwards.
## 2025-02-17: Promote 2025-02-11 to default release (default)
## 2025-02-11: recovery: Walk partitions to delete recovery.bin (latest)
* recovery: Walk partitions to delete recovery.bin
Previously, recovery.bin would fail to delete itself
if the bootrom loaded recovery.bin where there are multiple FAT
partitions and the first partition does not contain recovery.bin
Update the rename code to walk the partition table to find
the recovery.bin file to delete.
* Enable overriding of high partition numbers
Previously, the PARTITION=N bootloader config setting would only
be used at power on reset or if the partition number passed to
reboot was zero.
Change the behaviour so that the bootloader config PARTITION
property can override the reboot partition number if the reboot
parameter is > 31.
* Walk the partition table if the requested partition is not bootable
Previously, if the specified boot partition was not bootable the
bootloader would stop and advance to the next BOOT_ORDER. If the
new PARTITION_WALK option is set to 1 the bootloader will now
check each partition in turn starting from the specified partition
before advancing the BOOT_ORDER.
This feature is intended for use with A/B systems to handle the case
where autoboot.txt is missing / corrupted. This change enables
the system to failover to the next available bootable partition.
The autoboot.txt file is not scanned during the partition-walk
phase i.e. there is no recursive processing of autoboot.txt files.
This option is only supported on physical block devices
(SD, NVMe, USB) and not RAMDISK. USB assumes a single high speed
device, partition walks on multiple USB devices is not recommended
and may cause timeouts.
* Improve keyboard handling in boot menu
Try and make it more likely that we have enough time to perform key
detection.
Ignore mice, which were being enumerated and slowing things down.
## 2024-12-07: Enable banklow (and so NUMA) by default (latest)
* Enable banklow (and so NUMA) by default

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@@ -1,294 +1,5 @@
# Raspberry Pi5 bootloader EEPROM release notes
## 2025-05-13: Promote 2025-05-08 to the default release (default)
## 2025-05-08: Implement TCP window for net boot (latest)
* arm_loader: Correct some mailbox response lengths
The GET_GENCMD_RESULT mailbox handler was setting the wrong response
length, and GET_FIRMWARE_COMMIT_HASH and GET_FIRMWARE_VARIANT were not
setting any length.
See: https://github.com/raspberrypi/firmware/issues/1968
* Signed boot and HTTP boot mode
HTTP boot mode is supposed to be disabled if signed boot is enabled and
a host is not specified. The code is checking the http_secure flag to
enforce this. But this is valid now we support custom CA certs.
Only disable HTTP mode if we're using the default HOST.
* Implement TCP window for net boot
The minimal IP stack used for https booting lacks the ability to cache
packets received out of order, which can lead to severe slowdown when
it happens. The problem seems to affect some ISPs more than others.
The receive window implemented here copes with packet losses of 10%.
* netboot: Correct the TCP MSS
* rp1_net: Overwrite the length field
Although concise, ORing in the packet length runs the risk of leaving
some unwanted bits set. Ensure the length field is cleared before
ORing in the required value.
* Correct msecs in debug timestamps
The fractional part of timestamps in UART debug output was showing the
100ths and 1000ths of a second, rather than 10ths and 100ths, causing
strange sequences that appear to jump backwards.
* Implement GET_BOARD_MAC_ADDRESS on Pi5
The Pi 5 EEPROM implements a subset of the original mailbox properties.
Add GET_BOARD_MAC_ADDRESS to the subset.
See: https://github.com/raspberrypi/rpi-eeprom/issues/698
* Ensure the initramfs matches the kernel
As far as is possible, both the kernel and initramfs are matched to the
device. However, where multiple kernel variants can run on a device, the
initramfs must be matched to the chosen kernel. Make that the sole rule
for initramfs selection, rather than duplicating the device matching
logic.
See: https://github.com/raspberrypi/firmware/issues/1965
* Enable logging messages from OS loader
Pi 5 EEPROM builds were missing the output from the main OS loading
function, including some important diagnostics. Enabling the logging
output from this loader code results in some near-duplicates, but is
more user friendly and is available via "sudo vclog -m".
## 2025-04-07: arm_dt: Revert to using the max fan speed (latest)
* arm_dt: Revert to using the max fan speed
It has been reported that the presence of a cooling fan at boot time
can lead to a maximum observed fan speed of ~300 but a current speed
of 0. The absence of a fan results in 0s for both metrics.
See: https://github.com/raspberrypi/rpi-eeprom/issues/690
## 2025-03-27: os_check: cm5: Check for CM5 specific dtbs (latest)
* os_check: cm5: Check for CM5 specific dtbs
Check for BCM2712 support in bcm2712-rpi-cm5-cm5io.dtb
or bcm2712-rpi-cm5l-cm5io.dtb on CM5 instead of bcm2712-rpi-5-b.dtb.
This avoids needing to put os_check=1 or specifying device_tree
in config.txt in minimal images for CM5.
See: https://github.com/raspberrypi/rpi-eeprom/issues/682
## 2025-03-19: Log the fan speed at boot (latest)
* Log the fan speed at boot
Record the fan RPM (and the maximum seen) during boot, so that it is
accessible using "sudo vclog -m".
See: https://github.com/raspberrypi/rpi-eeprom/issues/678
* Add current_supply to HAT+ support
Refactor the HAT library to make it more self-contained, and combine
the I2C address detection and the reading of the EEPROM contents.
Use it to allow the earlier boot stages to check for a current_supply
setting in the EEPROM of a normal (non-stackable) HAT+.
## 2025-03-10: Promote 2025-03-10 release to default (default)
## 2025-03-10: Add [boot_partition] filter plus SDRAM init fixes (latest)
* Update SDRAM init timings to intermittent 8-flash SDRAM init errors
on some boards.
See: https://github.com/raspberrypi/rpi-eeprom/issues/67
* config: Fix missing initialisation of selected_expr to 1 in config.txt
Without an [all] section the new expression filter might default to
false. This impacts the bootloader early parsing of config.txt
for things like boot_ramdisk rather than the later config.txt pass
for device-tree parsing.
* config_loader: Add support [boot_partition=N] as an expression filter
The boot_partition tests whether the partition number N matches
the number that the system is booting from. This expression is
only supported in config.txt and is designed to make it easier
to have common boot.img ramdisks in an A/B system where the
conditional loads a different cmdline.txt file depending on
which partition boot.img is loaded from.
## 2025-03-03: Fix bootloader pull configuration on 2712D0 (latest)
* Fix pull configuration on 2712D0
2712D0 uses a horrendously sparse set of pad control registers. Make
the pull-setting code sufficiently complex to cope.
See: https://github.com/raspberrypi/rpi-eeprom/issues/672
* Disable UARTA for CM5s without WiFi
Just as CM5s without WiFI don't need the SDIO interface, the Bluetooth
UART is unconnected. Disable the DT node to avoid kernel warnings and
save some cycles.
## 2025-02-17: Promote 2025-02-12 to the default release (default)
## 2025-02-12: Fixup change to disable 3.7V PMIC output on CM5 no-wifi (latest)
* Fixup change to disable 3.7V PMIC output on CM5 no-wifi
## 2025-02-11: CM5 no-Wifi stability improvements (latest)
* recovery: Walk partitions to delete recovery.bin
Previously, recovery.bin would fail to delete itself
if the bootrom loaded recovery.bin where there are multiple FAT
partitions and the first partition does not contain recovery.bin
Update the rename code to walk the partition table to find
the recovery.bin file to delete.
* pi5: Add config filter for simple boot variable expressions (experimental)
Add support for a new bootloader/config.txt conditional filter
which tests the partition, boot_count and boot_arg1 variables.
Syntax (no spaces):
ARG boot_arg1, boot_count or partition (EEPROM config stage only)
[ARG=VALUE] selected if (ARG == VALUE)
[ARG&MASK] selected if ((ARG & VALUE) != 0))
[ARG&MASK=VALUE] selected if ((ARG & MASK) == VALUE)
[ARG<VALUE] selected if (ARG < VALUE)
[ARG>VALUE] selected if (ARG > VALUE)
where VALUE and MASK are unsigned integer constants and ARG
corresponds to the value in the reset register before the
config file is parsed.
* pi5: Add a boot-count bootloader variable (experimental)
Store the boot-count in a reset register and increment just
before the boot-order state-machine. The boot-count variable
is visible via device-tree /proc/device-tree/chosen/bootloader/count
and can be read/set via vcmailbox
GET: sudo vcmailbox 0x0003008d 4 4 0
SET to N: sudo vcmailbox 0x0003808d 4 4 N
* pi5: Add user-defined reboot argument (boot_arg1) (experimental)
Add support for a user-defined boot parameter stored in a reset-safe
scratch register on BCM2712. This is visible via device-tree at
/proc/device-tree/chosen/bootloader/arg1 and via vcmailboxes
GET arg1: sudo vcmailbox 0x0003008c 8 8 1 0
SET arg1 to 42: sudo vcmailbox 0x0003808c 8 8 1 42
or via config.txt
set_reboot_arg1=42
The variable is NOT cleared automatically and will persist until
a power-on-reset.
* Enable overriding of high partition numbers
Previously, the PARTITION=N bootloader config setting would only
be used at power on reset or if the partition number passed to
reboot was zero.
Change the behaviour so that the bootloader config PARTITION
property can override the reboot partition number if the reboot
parameter is > 31.
* Disable WiFi PMIC output on CM5 modules without WiFi
Disable the 3.7V WiFi power supply on CM5 modules which do not have a
WiFi module fitted. This fixes some stability issues where a CM5
would shutdown due to a spurious over-voltage condition on the
non-connected WiFi power supply.
* Add memory barrier to the mbox handler
Firmware issue 1944 reports receiving kernel warnings about firmware
requests where the status return code is 0. This should not be
possible, as handle_mbox_property always sets the top bit of the return
code, with the bottom bit indicating success or failure. If the firmware
had died, the firmware driver would report a timeout due to the lack of
a mailbox interrupt, and that isn't happening.
See: https://github.com/raspberrypi/firmware/issues/1944
* support dts files with size-cells of 2
DTS files with a top-level #size-cells of 2 make a lot of sense for
systems with a lot of RAM, but the firmware is currently inconsistent
in its support for that. Fix up the other cases to honor #size-cells
and #address-cells.
* Disable SDIO2 for CM5s without WiFi
It has been observed that CM5s without WiFi hang on reboot. To prevent
that, disable the sdio2 node on those devices.
See: https://github.com/raspberrypi/linux/issues/6647
* arm_dt: Use dtoverlay_enable_node
Convert the open-coded DT node status changes to use the new dtoverlay
method dtoverlay_enable_node.
* dtoverlay: Add dtoverlay_enable_node
Add a helper function for setting the status of a node.
## 2025-01-27: Walk the partition table if the requested partition is not bootable (latest)
* Walk the partition table if the requested partition is not bootable
Previously, if the specified boot partition was not bootable the
bootloader would stop and advance to the next BOOT_ORDER. If the
new PARTITION_WALK option is set to 1 the bootloader will now
check each partition in turn starting from the specified partition
before advancing the BOOT_ORDER.
This feature is intended for use with A/B systems to handle the case
where autoboot.txt is missing / corrupted. This change enables
the system to failover to the next available bootable partition.
The autoboot.txt file is not scanned during the partition-walk
phase i.e. there is no recursive processing of autoboot.txt files.
This option is only supported on physical block devices
(SD, NVMe, USB) and not RAMDISK. USB assumes a single high speed
device, partition walks on multiple USB devices is not recommended
and may cause timeouts.
* Improve keyboard handling in boot menu
Try and make it more likely that we have enough time to perform key
detection.
Ignore mice, which were being enumerated and slowing things down.
## 2025-01-22: Promote 2025-01-22 to default release (default)
## 2025-01-22: Add DT /chosen property signed-boot boot.img hash (latest)
* Add DT /chosen property signed-boot boot.img hash
Make the sha256 hash of the boot.img file available via
device-tree /proc/device-tree/chosen/bootloader/boot_img_sha256 if
signed boot is enabled.
* filesystem: GPT autoboot/reboot partition number fixes for Pi4 and older
* Fix problems when setting arm_freq_min=arm_freq and display clocks
if performance governor is not enabled.
## 2025-01-14: Add set_reboot_order API (latest)
* Add set_reboot_order API and config.txt properties
If set_reboot_order is defined in config.txt or set via vcmailbox
then this will override the bootloader config BOOT_ORDER property
on the next reboot. The parameter is stored in a reset safe register
and is cleared by the bootloader after reading it.
Typically, the config.txt value only be used via rpiboot to
override the boot-order on the next reboot. Otherwise, it should
reside in a conditional section so that the boot order is not
overridden on every reboot.
Example, test network boot
sudo vcmailbox 0x0003808b 4 4 0xf4612; sudo reboot
## 2025-01-13: Improved SDRAM refresh timings for Pi5 16GB (latest)
* Improved SDRAM refresh timings for Pi5 - 16GB
* Add an option to wait for the power button to be pressed before booting.
If POWER_OFF_ON_HALT=1 and WAIT_FOR_POWER_BUTTON=1 in the bootloader
config then the bootloader will wait for either the power button
to be pressed or an RTC alarm before booting. The wait state
switches the PMIC to STANDBY mode which is the lowest possible
power state.
## 2025-01-08: Update SDRAM refresh timings for BCM2712D0 products (latest)
* Update SDRAM timings for BCM2712D0 products.
## 2025-01-07: Fixup M.2 HAT+ detection (latest)
* Fix a potential timing issue introduced in the 2025-01-06
release when enabling PCIE_PWR when booting from SD/USB.
## 2025-01-06: Stop the fan after after fan-probe (latest)
* Stop the fan after after fan-probe
After the fan-probe has completed drive the fan PWM GPIO
to high if a fan was detected and let the OS take over.
* Add SD_QUIRKS for hardware bringup / workarounds
Add a new SD_QUIRKS flags property which can be used to
disable high-speed mode (bit 0). Other bits are reserved for
future use.
* Change uart_2ndstage default to 1 on Pi5
Change the default to 1 because this gives useful diagnostics
for device-tree loading with minimal overhead. Set uart_2ndstage=0
or BOOT_UART=0 to disable this.
* Move M.2 HAT+ detection to early boot.
Initialse M.2 HAT+ detection before DDR init to give NVMe
drive firmware more time to boot.
## 2024-12-19: Disable fan PWM before shutdown (latest)
* Disable fan PWM before shutdown
Drive the RP1 fan PWM GPIO high before entering the VPU
sleep (POWER_OFF_ON_HALT=0) to stop the fan spinning.
* Disable fan PWM GPIO between RP1 init and fan probe
Drive fan PWM GPIO high during early boot to disable the fan
until it is probed during the device-tree setup stage.
This stops the spinning at max rpm during network-install.
* arm_dt: enable_uart defaults to 0 on 2712
The default value of enable_uart on 2712 is 0, regardless of the
presence of the debug UART cable, so guarantee that the default is
always set correctly.
## 2024-12-15: Add net install to boot menu (latest)
* Add net install to boot menu
Press N (or shift).
* enable_uart: Require enable_uart=1 to enable RP1 UART console
See: https://github.com/raspberrypi/rpi-eeprom/issues/643
## 2024-12-07: Enable banklow (and so NUMA) by default (latest)
* Enable banklow (and so NUMA) by default

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@@ -3,5 +3,4 @@ BOOT_UART=0
WAKE_ON_GPIO=1
ENABLE_SELF_UPDATE=1
BOOT_ORDER=0xf21
NET_INSTALL_AT_POWER_ON=1

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@@ -3,4 +3,4 @@ BOOT_UART=0
WAKE_ON_GPIO=1
ENABLE_SELF_UPDATE=1
BOOT_ORDER=0xf41
NET_INSTALL_AT_POWER_ON=1

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@@ -3,5 +3,4 @@ BOOT_UART=0
WAKE_ON_GPIO=1
ENABLE_SELF_UPDATE=1
BOOT_ORDER=0xf14
NET_INSTALL_AT_POWER_ON=1

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@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ set -e
script_dir=$(cd "$(dirname "$0")" && pwd)
# Pi4, Pi400, CM4, CM4-S
${script_dir}/make-release critical 2025-02-11 000138c0 "${script_dir}/2711-config" release-2711 rpi-boot-eeprom-recovery 2711
${script_dir}/make-release critical 2023-01-11 000138c0 "${script_dir}/2711-config" release-2711 rpi-boot-eeprom-recovery 2711
# Pi5
${script_dir}/make-release critical 2025-02-12 "" "${script_dir}/2712-config" release-2712 rpi-boot-eeprom-recovery 2712
${script_dir}/make-release critical 2024-11-12 "" "${script_dir}/2712-config" release-2712 rpi-boot-eeprom-recovery 2712

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@@ -171,6 +171,8 @@ def apply_update(config, eeprom=None, config_src=None):
sys.stdout.write("Updating bootloader EEPROM\n image: %s\nconfig_src: %s\nconfig: %s\n%s\n%s\n%s\n" %
(eeprom_image, config_src, config, '#' * 80, config_str, '#' * 80))
sys.stdout.write("\n*** To cancel this update run 'sudo rpi-eeprom-update -r' ***\n\n")
# Ignore APT package checksums so that this doesn't fail when used
# with EEPROMs with configs delivered outside of APT.
# The checksums are really just a safety check for automatic updates.

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@@ -6,12 +6,8 @@
# a hard dependency on OpenSSL.
set -e
set -u
OPENSSL=${OPENSSL:-openssl}
KEY=""
SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH=${SOURCE_DATE_EPOCH:-""}
HSM_WRAPPER=""
die() {
echo "$@" >&2
@@ -50,30 +46,28 @@ RSA signature. Typically this tool is used by rpi-eeprom-update to
generate a hash to guard against file-system corruption for EEPROM updates
OR for signing OS images (boot.img) for secure-boot.
This tool CANNOT be used directly to sign a bootloader EEPROM image
for secure-boot because the signed data is the bootloader configuration file
This tool CANNOT be used directly to sign an bootloader EEPROM image
for secure-boot because the signed data is bootloader configuration file
rather than the entire flash image.
To create signed bootloader images, please see
To create signed bootloader images please see
https://github.com/raspberrypi/usbboot/tree/master/secure-boot-recovery/README.md
Options:
-i The source image, e.g., boot.img
-o The name of the digest/signature file
-k Optional RSA private key
-H The name of the HSM wrapper script to invoke - default ""
-i The source image e.g. boot.img
-o The name of the digest/signature file.
-k Optional RSA private key.
RSA signing:
If a private key in PEM format or a PKCS#11 URI is supplied, then the
RSA signature of the SHA256 digest is included in the .sig
file. Currently, the bootloader only supports SHA256 digests signed
with a 2048-bit RSA key. The bootloader only verifies RSA signatures
in signed boot mode and only for the EEPROM config file and the signed
image.
RSA signing
If a private key in PEM format is supplied then the RSA signature of the
sha256 digest is included in the .sig file. Currently, the bootloader only
supports sha256 digests signed with a 2048bit RSA key.
The bootloader only verifies RSA signatures in signed boot mode
and only for the EEPROM config file and the signed image.
Examples:
# Generate the normal SHA256 hash to guard against file-system corruption
# Generate the normal sha256 hash to guard against file-system corruption
rpi-eeprom-digest -i pieeprom.bin -o pieeprom.sig
rpi-eeprom-digest -i vl805.bin -o vl805.sig
@@ -82,15 +76,7 @@ rpi-eeprom-digest -k private.pem -i boot.img -o boot.sig
# Generate RSA signature for the EEPROM config file
# As used by update-pieeprom.sh in usbboot/secure-boot-recovery
rpi-eeprom-digest -k private.pem -i bootconf.txt -o bootconf.sig
# Generate RSA signature for the EEPROM config file and delegate
# the signing process to a HSM wrapper script instead of using the private key directly.
rpi-eeprom-digest -H hsm-wrapper -i bootconf.txt -o bootconf.sig
# Similarly, but specifying the key with a PKCS#11 URI
# (Deprecated - use HSM wrapper instead)
rpi-eeprom-digest -k pkcs11:token=deadbeef;object=bl-key;type=private;pin-value=1234 -i bootconf.txt -o bootconf.sig
rpi-eeprom-digest -k private.pem -i bootconf.txt -o bootconf.sig
# To verify the signature of an existing .sig file using the public key.
# N.B The key file must be the PUBLIC key in PEM format.
@@ -112,10 +98,9 @@ writeSig() {
echo "ts: $(date -u +%s)" >> "${OUTPUT}"
fi
if [ -n "${HSM_WRAPPER}" ]; then
echo "rsa2048: $("${HSM_WRAPPER}" -a rsa2048-sha256 "${IMAGE}")" >> "${OUTPUT}"
elif [ -n "${KEY}" ]; then
"${OPENSSL}" dgst ${ENGINE_OPTS} -sign "${KEY}" -sha256 -out "${SIG_TMP}" "${IMAGE}"
if [ -n "${KEY}" ]; then
[ -f "${KEY}" ] || die "RSA private \"${KEY}\" not found"
"${OPENSSL}" dgst -sign "${KEY}" -keyform PEM -sha256 -out "${SIG_TMP}" "${IMAGE}"
echo "rsa2048: $(xxd -c 4096 -p < "${SIG_TMP}")" >> "${OUTPUT}"
fi
}
@@ -127,20 +112,18 @@ verifySig() {
sig_hex="$(grep rsa2048 "${sig_file}" | cut -f 2 -d ' ')"
[ -n "${sig_hex}" ] || die "No RSA signature in ${sig_file}"
echo "${sig_hex}" | xxd -c 4096 -p -r > "${TMP_DIR}/sig.bin"
"${OPENSSL}" dgst ${ENGINE_OPTS} -verify "${KEY}" -signature "${TMP_DIR}/sig.bin" "${IMAGE}" || die "${IMAGE} not verified"
echo ${sig_hex} | xxd -c 4096 -p -r > "${TMP_DIR}/sig.bin"
"${OPENSSL}" dgst -verify "${KEY}" -signature "${TMP_DIR}/sig.bin" "${IMAGE}" || die "${IMAGE} not verified"
}
OUTPUT=""
VERIFY=0
while getopts i:H:k:ho:v: option; do
while getopts i:k:ho:v: option; do
case "${option}" in
i) IMAGE="${OPTARG}"
;;
k) KEY="${OPTARG}"
;;
H) HSM_WRAPPER="${OPTARG}"
;;
o) OUTPUT="${OPTARG}"
;;
v) SIGNATURE="${OPTARG}"
@@ -159,18 +142,6 @@ checkDependencies
[ -n "${IMAGE}" ] || usage
[ -f "${IMAGE}" ] || die "Source image \"${IMAGE}\" not found"
[ "${VERIFY}" != 1 ] || [ -n "${KEY}" ] || die "Option -v also requires passing public key via -k"
if [ -n "${KEY}" ] ; then
if [ -f "${KEY}" ] ; then
ENGINE_OPTS=
elif echo "${KEY}" | grep -q "^pkcs11:" ; then
ENGINE_OPTS="-engine pkcs11 -keyform engine"
else
die "RSA key \"${KEY}\" not found"
fi
fi
if [ "${VERIFY}" = 1 ]; then
verifySig "${SIGNATURE}"
else

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@@ -14,8 +14,6 @@ LOCAL_MODE=0
if [ -n "$FIRMWARE_ROOT" ]; then
# Provided by environment
true
elif [ -d /usr/lib/firmware/raspberrypi/bootloader ] || [ -d /usr/lib/firmware/raspberrypi/bootloader-2711 ] || [ -d /usr/lib/firmware/raspberrypi/bootloader-2712 ]; then
FIRMWARE_ROOT=/usr/lib/firmware/raspberrypi/bootloader
elif [ -d /lib/firmware/raspberrypi/bootloader ] || [ -d /lib/firmware/raspberrypi/bootloader-2711 ] || [ -d /lib/firmware/raspberrypi/bootloader-2712 ]; then
FIRMWARE_ROOT=/lib/firmware/raspberrypi/bootloader
else
@@ -904,11 +902,6 @@ checkVersion()
if [ "${ACTION_UPDATE_BOOTLOADER}" = 1 ] || [ "${ACTION_UPDATE_VL805}" = 1 ]; then
echo "*** UPDATE AVAILABLE ***"
echo ""
echo "Run \"sudo rpi-eeprom-update -a\" to install this update now."
echo
echo "To configure the bootloader update policy run \"sudo ${RPI_EEPROM_UPDATE_CONFIG_TOOL}\""
echo ""
printVersions
write_status_info "EXIT_UPDATE_REQUIRED"
exit ${EXIT_UPDATE_REQUIRED}

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
FIRMWARE_ROOT=/usr/lib/firmware/raspberrypi/bootloader
FIRMWARE_ROOT=/lib/firmware/raspberrypi/bootloader
FIRMWARE_RELEASE_STATUS="default"
FIRMWARE_BACKUP_DIR="/var/lib/raspberrypi/bootloader/backup"
EEPROM_CONFIG_HOOK=

View File

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
# rpi-eeprom - unit tests
## test-rpi-eeprom-config
Unit test for rpi-eeprom-config which verifies:
* rpi-eeprom-config is compatible with all EEPROM binaries
* unit tests for modifying the boot.conf file
* simple code signing test
To run on Linux:
```
cd test
./test-rpi-eeprom-config
```

View File

@@ -20,14 +20,14 @@ CONFIG="/etc/default/rpi-eeprom-update"
[ "$(id -u)" = "0" ] || die "$0 Must be run as root - try 'sudo $0 [-b]'"
# Clear out the old firmware
rm -rf /usr/lib/firmware/raspberrypi/bootloader
rm -rf /usr/lib/firmware/raspberrypi/bootloader-2711
rm -rf /usr/lib/firmware/raspberrypi/bootloader-2712
rm -rf /lib/firmware/raspberrypi/bootloader
rm -rf /lib/firmware/raspberrypi/bootloader-2711
rm -rf /lib/firmware/raspberrypi/bootloader-2712
mkdir -p /usr/lib/firmware/raspberrypi/bootloader-2711
rsync -alv "${FIRMWARE_DIR}-2711"/* /usr/lib/firmware/raspberrypi/bootloader-2711 || echo "Failed"
mkdir -p /usr/lib/firmware/raspberrypi/bootloader-2712
rsync -alv "${FIRMWARE_DIR}-2712"/* /usr/lib/firmware/raspberrypi/bootloader-2712 || echo "Failed"
mkdir -p /lib/firmware/raspberrypi/bootloader-2711
rsync -alv "${FIRMWARE_DIR}-2711"/* /lib/firmware/raspberrypi/bootloader-2711 || echo "Failed"
mkdir -p /lib/firmware/raspberrypi/bootloader-2712
rsync -alv "${FIRMWARE_DIR}-2712"/* /lib/firmware/raspberrypi/bootloader-2712 || echo "Failed"
cp -fv "${script_dir}/../rpi-eeprom-config" /usr/bin
cp -fv "${script_dir}/../rpi-eeprom-digest" /usr/bin

View File

@@ -2,11 +2,8 @@
import argparse
import base64
import os
import struct
import subprocess
import sys
import tempfile
# python3 -m pip install pycryptodomex
from Cryptodome.Hash import HMAC, SHA1, SHA256
@@ -108,30 +105,6 @@ class ImageFile:
debug("%08x %20s: [%6d] %s" % (self.pos(), 'RSA', len(arr), pem_file))
self.append(arr)
h = SHA256.new()
h.update(key.n.to_bytes(256, byteorder='little'))
h.update(key.e.to_bytes(8, byteorder='little'))
d = h.hexdigest()
pub_str = ""
for i in range(int(len(d)/8)):
pub_str += "0x%s%s%s%s, " % (d[i*8+6:i*8+8], d[i*8+4:i*8+6], d[i*8+2:i*8+4], d[i*8+0:i*8+2])
debug("Public key SHA256(N,e) = %s" % pub_str)
def append_rsa_signature_pkcs11(self, hsm_wrapper):
temp = tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(delete=False)
temp.write(self._bytes)
temp.close() # close and flush before spawning PKCS#11 wrapper
res = subprocess.run([hsm_wrapper, "-a", "rsa2048-sha256", temp.name], capture_output=True)
debug(res.stderr)
if res.returncode != 0:
os.unlink(temp.name)
raise Exception(f"HSM wrapper failed with exit code {res.returncode}: {res.stderr.decode()}")
signature = res.stdout.decode()
os.unlink(temp.name)
self.append(bytearray.fromhex(signature))
debug("PKCS11 %08x %20s: [%6d] signature %s" % (self.pos(), 'RSA2048 - SHA256', len(signature), signature))
def append_rsa_signature(self, digest_alg, private_pem):
"""
Append a RSA 2048 signature of the SHA256 of the data so far
@@ -159,13 +132,19 @@ class ImageFile:
if len(hmac_key) != expected_keylen:
raise Exception("Bad key length %d expected %d" % (len(hmac_key), expected_keylen))
if digest_alg == 'hmac-sha1':
h = HMAC.new(base64.b16decode(hmac_key, True), self._bytes, digestmod=SHA1)
if digest_alg == 'hmac-sha256':
digest = HMAC.new(base64.b16decode(hmac_key, True), self._bytes, digestmod=SHA256)
elif digest_alg == 'hmac-sha1':
digest = HMAC.new(base64.b16decode(hmac_key, True), self._bytes, digestmod=SHA1)
elif digest_alg == 'sha256':
digest = SHA256.new(self._bytes)
elif digest_alg == 'sha1':
digest = SHA1.new(self._bytes)
else:
raise Exception("Digest not supported %s" % (digest_alg))
debug("%08x %20s: [%6d] %s" % (self.pos(), digest_alg, len(h.digest()), h.hexdigest()))
self.append(h.digest())
debug("%08x %20s: [%6d] %s" % (self.pos(), digest_alg, len(digest.digest()), digest.hexdigest()))
self.append(digest.digest())
def pos(self):
return len(self._bytes)
@@ -182,7 +161,7 @@ class ImageFile:
def close(self):
self._of.close()
def create_2711_image(output, bootcode, private_key=None, private_keynum=0, hmac=None, hsm_wrapper=None):
def create_2711_image(output, bootcode, private_key, private_keynum, hmac):
"""
Create a 2711 C0 secure-boot compatible seconds stage signed binary.
"""
@@ -190,31 +169,22 @@ def create_2711_image(output, bootcode, private_key=None, private_keynum=0, hmac
image.append_file(bootcode)
image.append_length()
image.append_keynum(private_keynum)
if hsm_wrapper:
image.append_rsa_signature_pkcs11(hsm_wrapper)
else:
image.append_rsa_signature('sha1', private_key)
image.append_rsa_signature('sha1', private_key)
image.append_digest('hmac-sha1', hmac)
image.write()
image.close()
def create_2712_image(output, bootcode, private_version=0, public_key=None, private_key=None, private_keynum=0, hsm_wrapper=None):
def create_2712_image(output, bootcode, private_key, private_keynum, private_version):
"""
Create a prototype 2712 signed bootloader. The HMAC is removed and the
full public key is appended.
Create 2712 signed bootloader. The HMAC is removed and the full public key is appended.
"""
image = ImageFile(output, MAX_BIN_SIZE)
image.append_file(bootcode)
image.append_length()
image.append_keynum(private_keynum)
image.append_version(private_version)
if hsm_wrapper is not None:
debug(f"Call HSM wrapper {hsm_wrapper}")
image.append_rsa_signature_pkcs11(hsm_wrapper)
image.append_public_key(public_key)
else:
image.append_rsa_signature('sha256', private_key)
image.append_public_key(private_key)
image.append_rsa_signature('sha256', private_key)
image.append_public_key(private_key)
image.write()
image.close()
@@ -223,43 +193,37 @@ def main():
Signs a second stage bootloader image.
Examples:
Customer counter-signed:
2711 mode:
rpi-sign-bootcode --debug -c 2711 -i bootcode.bin.clr -o bootcode.bin -k 2711_rsa_priv_0.pem -n 0 -m bootcode-production.key
2712 C1 and D0 mode:
* HMAC not included on 2712
* RSA public key included - ROM just contains the hashes of the RPi public keys.
Customer counter-signed signed:
* Exactly the same as Raspberry Pi signing but the input is the Raspberry Pi signed bootcode.bin
* The key number will probably always be 16 to indicate a customer signing
rpi-sign-bootcode --debug -c 2712 -i bootcode.bin.sign2 -o bootcode.bin -k customer.pem
PKCS#1 v1.5 - HSM wrapper:
* hsm-wrapper takes a single argument which is a temporary filename containing the data to sign
* hsm-wrapper outputs the PKCS#1 v1.5 signature in hex format
* hsm-wrapper must return a non-zero exit code if signing fails
* hsm-wrapper requires the -a rsa2048-sha256 parameter to specify the algorithm
* There is no facility to pass the private key or custom HSM arguments - the caller should generate a dedicated wrapper script
* The public key in PEM format MUST be specified with the -p option
rpi-sign-bootcode --debug -c 2712 -i bootcode.bin.sign2 -o bootcode.bin -p public.pem -H hsm-wrapper
"""
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(help_text)
parser.add_argument('-o', '--output', required=False, help='Output filename. If not specified, the signed image is written to stdout in base64 format')
parser.add_argument('-o', '--output', required=False, help='Output filename . If not specified the signed images is written to stdout in base64 format')
parser.add_argument('-c', '--chip', required=True, type=int, help='Chip number')
parser.add_argument('-i', '--input', required=False, help='Path of the unsigned bootcode.bin file OR RPi signed bootcode file to be signed with the customer key. If NULL, the binary is read from stdin in base64 format')
parser.add_argument('-i', '--input', required=False, help='Path of the unsigned bootcode.bin file OR RPi signed bootcode file sign with the customer key. If NULLL the binary is read from stdin in base64 format')
parser.add_argument('-m', '--hmac', required=False, help='Path of the HMAC key file')
parser.add_argument('-k', '--private-key', dest='private_key', required=False, default=None, help='Path of RSA private key (PEM format)')
parser.add_argument('-p', '--public-key', dest='public_key', required=False, default=None, help='Path of RSA public key (PEM format)')
parser.add_argument('-k', '--private-key', dest='private_key', required=True, help='Path of RSA private key (PEM format)')
parser.add_argument('-n', '--private-keynum', dest='private_keynum', required=False, default=0, type=int, help='ROM key index for RPi signing stage')
parser.add_argument('-H', '--hsm-wrapper', default=None, required=False, help='Filename of HSM wrapper script which generates a PKCSv1.1 signature as hex')
parser.add_argument('-d', '--debug', action='store_true')
parser.add_argument('-v', '--private-version', dest='private_version', required=False, default=0, type=int, help='Version of firmware, stops firmware rollback, only valid 0-31')
parser.add_argument('-v', '--private-version', dest='private_version', required=True, type=int, help='Version of firmware, stops firmware rollback, only valid 0-31')
args = parser.parse_args()
_CONFIG['DEBUG'] = args.debug
if args.chip == 2711:
if args.hmac is None:
raise Exception("HMAC key requried for 2711")
create_2711_image(args.output, args.input, private_key=args.private_key, private_keynum=args.private_keynum, hmac=args.hmac, hsm_wrapper=args.hsm_wrapper)
create_2711_image(args.output, args.input, args.private_key, args.private_keynum, args.hmac)
elif args.chip == 2712:
create_2712_image(args.output, args.input, private_version=args.private_version, public_key=args.public_key, private_key=args.private_key, private_keynum=args.private_keynum, hsm_wrapper=args.hsm_wrapper)
create_2712_image(args.output, args.input, args.private_key, args.private_keynum, args.private_version)
if __name__ == '__main__':
main()